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(We might apply this understanding to the problem of campaign 
financing too.) 
4. First-year constitutional law courses spend a lot of time on 
questions of federalism, and the chief concern in those discussions is 
whether there are limits to the federal government's power. I often 
wonder whether we are wasting our time in these debates. The 
most interesting development along these lines is Congress's in-
creasingly common use of "crossover conditions" on government 
spending. These are conditions that have nothing to do with how 
federal money is spent. Congress has tied highway funds to the 
minimum drinking age (South Dakota v. DOT), education aid to 
draft registration (the Solomon Amendment), and sewage treatment 
grants to clean air (Clean Air Act). The proposed Civil Rights Res-
toration Act will impose new nondiscrimination obligations on re-
cipients who get any kind of federal money. One can imagine 
connections between these grants and their conditions but it's get-
ting hard. A lot of state and local officials and a handful of academ-
ics have pointed out the problem. No one has proposed a natural 
stopping place. Is there no limit to regulatory uses of the spending 
power? 
5. I wish somebody not teaching at Chicago would write 
about the contracts clause. 
RICHARD E. MORGAN32 
I was browsing recently in an obscure Ph.D. thesis on free 
speech theory, when the following sentence leapt out at me: "What 
are the obligations owed between persons who cannot agree on fun-
damentals?" The young George Will was reflecting on the agonies 
of the pre-Civil War generation, but the questions strike me as pre-
cisely relevant today. A year of Bicentennial debating and paneling 
has convinced me of what I had suspected for some time-that 
there is deeper disagreement over the "fundamentals" of the Consti-
tution of the United States, over its substance understood as the 
meaning of its provisions, than at any time since the 1850s. 
There is decreasing common ground between the variety of in-
terpretivists (who argue that if a reasonably clear, historically-
grounded content cannot be found in a provision of the Constitu-
tion then the party relying on the Constitution fails) and those who 
would apply the "open-ended" and "majestic" phrases of the Con-
stitution according to our own best lights in an effort to vindicate 
the general values thought to have been subscribed to by the fram-
32. Professor of History, Bowdoin College. 
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ers. In area after area, from federalism to church-state relations, 
and from affirmative action to due process privacy rights, we are at 
loggerheads. 
Ironically, the Bicentennial observation has had the effect of 
making this gulf more visible to specialists and non-specialists alike. 
Thus, one conference or symposium will celebrate the genius of the 
framers and their new science of politics, while the next will stress 
the essentially flawed, or incomplete, or even vicious nature of the 
original Constitution until it was supplemented by the fourteenth 
amendment, the election of Franklin Roosevelt, Brown v. Board, or 
any number of innovations from the 1960s and 1970s. I remember 
one distinguished law professor arguing earnestly that the standard 
oath of office (to "support and defend the Constitution of the 
United States") was incoherent because there is so little agreed-
upon, substantive content to the Constitution. And then there was 
the casual remark of another eminent professor that the govern-
ment of the United States could not be regarded as legitimate until 
passage of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. And finally, I 
remember Lincoln Caplan's New Yorker pieces of last summer in 
which he vilified the Solicitor General and Justice Department for 
disrespect for "the law," without, apparently, the slightest realiza-
tion that however wrong-headed Charles Fried and Brad Reynolds 
may be, they are acting precisely to combat what they regard as 
"lawlessness" and "disrespect for the law." The whole increasingly 
desperate combat is about what "the law" is and who speaks it au-
thoritatively to whom. 
The struggle over the Bork nomination swirls arond me as this 
is written, and the prospect for reestablishing an interpretive com-
munity in America seems, frankly, remote. But perhaps this is just 
the time to force ourselves to think about what kinds of constitu-
tional scholarship might contribute to that end. If the constitutive 
act of civilization is reasoned conversation with other persons, and 
if scholarship is the most advanced, disciplined, and focused form of 
conversation, then surely it has something to contribute to the crea-
tion of common ground between the traditionalists and the radical 
innovators. Here are my suggestions. 
1. A Pox on Abstraction. Let us cultivate a healthy skepticism 
toward the manufacturing of new and more abstruse "comprehen-
sive theories" of constitutional law. Let scholarship refocus on the 
American tradition to see what options it, in fact, makes available 
to those who must construe the Constitution today. Let us get Her-
cules a job preparing nineteenth century state legislative histories. 
Particular attention should be paid to the lost significance of the 
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privileges and immunities clause. It strikes me as likely that a case 
can be made out that the fourteenth amendment extended to the 
states substantive restraints beyond those embodied in the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1866. In other words, there is grounding in tradition 
for positions between Raoul Berger and the contemporary followers 
of Horace Flack. 
2. Rehabilitate John Marshall. This will bear most heavily 
on the left in contemporary constitutional politics. Surely we can 
get nowhere without restored agreement on what justifies judicial 
review. We need no plurals here-definite articles are the thing! 
Constitutional review can only be justified as the enforcement of a 
past extraordinary majority against a majority of the moment. Leg-
islative victories yield to those anterior agreements that we made 
with ourselves in the mode of We The People. This is the justifica-
tion for judicial review of The Federalist No. 78, James Wilson's law 
lectures at the College of Philadelphia, and Marbury; it is the only 
one that will do. Not only do history and convention exclude sub-
stitute justifications, they are logically excluded-no other justifica-
tion can be reconciled to the primary commitment to self-
government on which our constitutional edifice rests. This leaves 
plenty of room for argument over the quality of what it was that a 
past constitutional majority thought it won; maybe that majority 
did think it was constitutionalizing a general principle. But let's 
have a reality constraint on the debate. 
3. Develop a Doctrine of Relative Outrageousness of Past Er-
rors. This requirement will bear principally on the right. It re-
quires traditionalists to ask what it means to pursue a jurisprudence 
of original intention in a context in which original intention has 
been flouted in the past. Or, to put the matter differently, what 
nontraditional outcomes in constitutional law must now be re-
garded as traditional? For defenders of Warren-era activism to talk 
solemnly today about respect for precedent and settled law repre-
sents what can only be called an exercise in the higher chutzpah-
soaring far beyond the boy who kills his parents and asks pity as an 
orphan. Yet it is equally strange for conservatives to treat prece-
dents casually; the avoidance of radical discontinuity in constitu-
tional law is something they should care about. And those who 
inveighed in the wilderness against the light-heartedly innovative 
judicial styles so praised in the 1960s and 1970s should hardly want 
to initiate them. 
